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 Mahler’s book starts with a very interesting premise: given 
the similarities in causes in the  Challenger and  Columbia 
disasters, there may be evidence that NASA is “not a learning 
organization.” The book seeks to establish whether there was 
any evidence of learning from the  Challenger (and indeed 
some, albeit limited learning seems to have occurred) and 
then to propose some analyses and lessons from the various 
areas in which learning was lacking. The detailed case analy-
sis and ﬁ ndings are useful in grounding learning processes in 
a real-world case—one in which the causes of one major 
accident are eerily reﬂ ected in a second major accident 
17 years later. 
 The causes of both disasters lay in technical issues (O-ring 
blow by and foam shedding), which had been experienced 
many times previously, had been “normalized” (Vaughan, 
1996), and over which individuals in the organization had 
expressed concerns. Both commissions charged with investi-
gating the disasters (the Rogers Commission for  Challenger 
and the  Columbia Accident Investigating Board) strongly 
implicated organizational issues that led to each of the 
disasters. The organizational problems, including cultural and 
other informal organization issues, were well known and were 
also well covered by Vaughan (1996, 2005). And yet the same 
organizational problems that created the  Challenger accident 
in 1986 are implicated in the  Columbia accident in 2003. So 
why didn’t NASA learn more from  Challenger —learn things 
that would have helped prevent  Columbia ? 
 The author uses a deﬁ nition of learning that minimally 
includes processes that result in (1) problem awareness; 
(2) cause-effect inferences; and (3) the institutionalization of 
actions designed to eliminate problem causes. Although the 
learning deﬁ nition and review of the learning literature are 
not the strongest part of the book, the detailed analyses of 
non-learning (and unlearning) and their organizational causes 
are insightful. Also insightful is the author’s observation of 
how effects at the organization level combine with regula-
tory pressures to affect learning processes and outcomes. 
Returning to the question of why NASA didn’t learn, the 
author’s analysis shows that one part of the answer is that 
NASA did, in fact, learn something about managing contrac-
tor relationships, basically eliminating them as contributors 
to the  Columbia disaster. The learning processes and 
outcomes in this area are outlined in some detail in chapter 
4. Yet, at the same time, there were many other learning 
opportunities that NASA failed to take advantage of, and 
whether it was a lack of attention, of analysis, or of imple-
mentation varied by situation. While it’s always hard to go 
back and predict what else might have occurred had 
something different been done, it seems that the implemen-
tation of fairly well-known and well-understood changes to 
NASA’s structure, culture, and decision-making processes 
might have at least increased the likelihood of preventing 
the  Columbia accident. Instead, these opportunities, all 
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recommendations from the Rogers Commission, were (1) 
not learned, (2) learned only superﬁ cially, or (3) learned and 
then subsequently unlearned. 
 I found the learning and then unlearning, which is outlined in 
chapter 3, particularly fascinating, as the idea of unlearning 
has not received much attention in the literature. One of the 
key instances of unlearning at NASA occurred around organi-
zational structure. One cause of problems that created 
conditions leading to the  Challenger accident was an organiza-
tional structure in which different elements of the shuttle 
program were placed under the command of different NASA 
centers. The Rogers Commission noted this as problematic, 
in part because rivalry among centers, different organizational 
cultures, lack of responsibility and accountability, and cross-
center communication issues created information and coordi-
nation problems that led directly to the  Challenger accident. 
After  Challenger , the shuttle program structure was rede-
signed under centralized headquarters responsibility, an 
explicit return to the structure that had worked well with the 
 Apollo program and a good instance of learning from earlier 
experiences. The new centralized structure improved commu-
nication and coordination issues and remained in place until 
the 1990s. But then reorganization occurred under the 
administration of Dan Goldin, and the system reverted to a 
decentralized structure under different centers. This was 
done as part of a series of efforts to improve efﬁ ciency and 
also to respond to rather severe external political and budget-
ary pressures. The return to a decentralized structure contrib-
uted to the same communication and coordination problems 
as before, creating conditions favoring the  Columbia disaster. 
 In addition to learning and then unlearning, there are also 
examples of non-learning and superﬁ cial learning from the 
 Challenger accident. Many instances of non-learning and 
superﬁ cial learning came as a result of external political and 
budgetary pressures. The effect of political pressure on 
organizational learning (or non-learning, in this case) is an 
interesting extension of our existing learning theories. Chap-
ter 5 outlines the pressures and NASA’s non-learning 
responses and includes the interesting idea that the downsiz-
ing of NASA, which created many learning problems as 
organizational memory disappeared with staff cutbacks, was 
a mimetic response to prevailing faddish ideas about the 
beneﬁ ts of downsizing prevalent in the 1990s. 
 The last of the detailed case analysis chapters, chapter 6, 
looks at how cultural issues at NASA inhibited learning. One 
of the strengths of the book is the detailed analysis of the 
three different processes through which unlearning and 
non-learning take place: never learn, learn then unlearn, and 
learn superﬁ cially (or symbolically). This book deepens our 
understanding of the complexities of learning processes in 
the public service context, but it should also be useful to all 
scholars of organizations and organizational learning for its 
detailed analysis of the non-learning and unlearning that 
occurred between the two disasters. There are likely many 
cases of private organizations failing to learn or unlearning 
previously learned lessons, and though there have been 
useful explorations of the processes involved in organizational 
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mistakes and failures, repeated failures by a single organiza-
tion and especially the processes that lead to unlearning 
remain relatively underexplored. 
 The last two chapters of the book are devoted to outlining the 
implications of the previous chapters for managers, regula-
tors, and other interested parties. One chapter is devoted to 
the challenges of learning in public organizations. The other 
outlines speciﬁ c recommendations for organizational struc-
tures and processes, especially learning processes, that might 
help avoid repeated failures. Organizational scholars will see 
similarities in these recommendations to existing work on 
high reliability organizations (e.g., Weick, Sutcliffe, and 
Obstfeld, 1999). But there are interesting additions and 
explorations of things like the role of personnel turnover and 
political pressures as barriers to organizational learning; 
learning and non-learning are intertwined with internal and 
external factors, and multiple institutional forces can interfere 
with the learning process. This is an interesting detailed 
analysis of non-learning in an organization, and both the 
analysis and the recommendations should be of interest to 
varied audiences: practitioners, political scientists, policy 
makers, and organizational theorists. 
 Pamela R. Haunschild 
 McCombs School of Business 
 University of Texas at Austin 
 Austin, TX 78712 
 REFERENCES 
 Vaughan, D. 
 1996 The  Challenger Launch Decision: 
Risky Technology, Culture, and 
Deviance at NASA. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 2005 “System effects: On slippery 
slopes, repeating negative 
patterns, and learning from 
mistakes.” In W. H. Starbuck 
and M. Farjoun (eds.), Organi-
zation at the Limit: NASA and 
the  Columbia Disaster: 41–59 . 
Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
 Weick, K. E., K. Sutcliffe, and 
D. Obstfeld 
 1999 “Organizing for high reliability.” 
In R. I. Sutton and B. M. Staw 
(eds.), Research in Organiza-
tional Behavior, 21: 81–123. 
Stamford, CT: JAI Press. 
 at University of Texas Libraries on February 25, 2015asq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
